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Two Conceptions of Kantian Autonomy
How to interpret autonomy plays a crucial role that leads to different readings in
Kant’s moral metaphysics, philosophy of religion and moral psychology. In this
paper I argue for a two-layered conception of autonomy with varying degrees of
justification for each: autonomy as a capacity and autonomy as a paragon-like
paradigm. I argue that all healthy rational humans possess the inalienable ca-
pacity of autonomy, i.e. share the universal ground for the communicability of
objective basic moral principles. This initial understanding stands for autonomy
as a capacity about which we can talk of universal validity and justification. Nev-
ertheless, the way a person fully actualizes herself, her freedom, namely autono-
my, is shaped by her initial conception of autonomy and moral view of the world.
Autonomy as an organic experience of real moral agents, which means an ongo-
ing, non-static, irreducible and inexplicable judgmental process concerning
one’s actualization of oneself gives way to consider autonomy as a godlike
state of the soul even though one cannot provide objective validity for this.
Kant’s moral philosophy is based on the notion of autonomy; he aims to es-
tablish the supreme principle of morality as autonomy (GMS, AA 4:434, 440).
Nevertheless the ground, content and scope of what is meant by autonomy is
far from being an issue of consensus. Therefore it is very significant to under-
stand Kant’s basic principles and assumptions regarding autonomy. An analysis
of Kantian autonomy necessarily relates to his explication of freedom,Wille/Will-
kür, practical reason and moral law. These concepts are not only dependent on
one another, but at times they even seem to be interchangeable. Such an ambi-
guity relates to Kant’s cautious and novel metaphysics in which epistemic and
ontological claims are neatly separated from one another. His metaphysics of
morals embraces several concepts that confuse or perhaps liberate the reader
about how to conceive their actuality. Therefore the basics of Kant’s moral theory
do not leave us with a fixed and closed system of concepts. It allows for a lati-
tude ranging from what can be cognized objectively towards the subjective judg-
ing of making the most sense of one’s moral experience as a human agent. In
this regard, unlike the foundationalism (or theism) of rationalist metaphysics,
his moral theory initially argues for an absolute independence from all sorts
of givenness. The vast connotations of this “absolute independence” of reason
obscures the reader especially in interpreting Kant’s theism, ethical community
and moral psychology. This paper aims at a reading that embraces Kant’s own
latitude without applying to reductionism of any sort to any ends. That non-re-
ductionist strategy argues, e.g., that while Kantian autonomy is a break from
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any divine command theory, from a certain perspective it can still be considered
as compatible with it. On the other hand, an explication of Kant’s notion of
hope, i.e. a teleological moral view of the world in which laws of morals and na-
ture can be considered in harmony does not need to end up with either moral
realism or absolute psychologism.
To start with the simplest definition, auto-nomos is the law-giving capacity
of reason. According to Kant, reason can be practical of itself, which means that
it can immanently determine itself according to its own principles. This determi-
nation, being necessary and universal, thus owns the lawful status. That lawful-
ness has both its content and ground of obligation, again, from reason itself. In
other words, a healthy moral agent can know (though fallibly) what is the right
action to take and why it should be taken. The latter part is very simply an-
swered, that because it is the right thing to do, one should and can act so with-
out looking for further motivations. That is, moral judgment owns its necessary
normative resource from itself, from the pure practical capacity of reason. To de-
code Kant’s moral metaphysics, I start with his analysis of will and freedom. The
initial analysis of these concepts exposes that autonomy is an inherent capacity
of human agents. The further enquiry into autonomy, in conjunction of deontol-
ogy and teleology, discloses that autonomy is also a paradigm for virtuous
human agents. Therefore, in the basics of Kant’s moral metaphysics, we have
epistemic certainty about our moral imputability and responsibility. Yet a further
inquiry about the very possibility of this undeniable and inalienable moral ca-
pacity and the possible limits of its actualization carries us to a domain where
we no more have the same, objective epistemic certainty.
Famously, in his inauguration of “philosophical moral cognition”, Kant de-
clares a good will to be the sole unconditional good, good without limitation
(GMS, AA 4:394). Thus we are required to figure out what good and what will
is. Distinguishing himself from the ancient notion of virtues, Kant states how
even virtues such as moderation, courage and self-control could only have con-
ditional worth. The goodness then is not attributed to a will via what it achieves
in consequence of certain actions or dispositions. Kant from the very beginning,
in his first major work in moral philosophy, Groundwork, introduces a peculiar
notion of the good. In his second Critique, apparently having received enough
criticism about this peculiarity, he explicates more about how and why he
seems to have prioritized the moral principle over the concept of the good
(KpV, AA 5:910). He definitely argues for a conception of the good which is inher-
ited neither from social customs, nor from an external divine authority. In the
second Critique, putting it in a specific form, Kant states that good, along with
evil, are the only objects of practical reason (KpV, AA 5:58). Nevertheless, this
does not disambiguate the emptiness of the concept ‘good’.
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Kant provides a definition of ‘good’ with reference to reason. He states that
whatever action is in conformity with the pure law of practical reason is good,
the will determined by that law is absolutely good and the supreme condition
of all that is good (KpV, AA 5:62). He argues that such goodness is valid for
every rational being, as it is determined by means of representations of reason
objectively (GMS, AA 4:414). This provides us an understanding of moral good-
ness which is inseparable from reason. Accordingly, in this picture moral good-
ness appears as a command of reason, and is attributed to a certain form of will-
ing / volition. Therefore, Kant’s starting point, i.e. “good will” narrows down to
an enquiry into the form of willing itself.
Kant defines the faculty of desire as the capacity of a being to act in accord-
ance with its own concepts and representations. That capacity either to do or re-
frain from certain actions can be determined by inclinations, impulses or by the
conscious determination of reason. Animals, Kant states, have arbitrium brutum,
as they act on their inclinations and instincts (MS, AA 6:212–4). Thus their power
of choice (Willkür) differs from human volition which is affected by sensations,
though is not determined by them. In this regard, humans (“arbitrium sensiti-
vum, yet not brutum but liberum”, KrV , A 534/B 562) are free from being deter-
mined by external causes. Nevertheless, as Kant frequently highlights, this
counts only as negative freedom, whereas he locates his moral theory and notion
of autonomy on the idea of positive freedom.
In the Groundwork (AA 4:446), Kant states that freedom is the key to explain
the autonomy of the will. He suggests that will is the causality of rationality and
freedom is the property of that will which can determine itself independently of
alien causes and/or natural necessities. So far the notion of freedom is negative.
Further than that, this will also has the property to be determined by its own law.
This refers to a truly free will in the Kantian context which is positive freedom.
That is, autonomy as “the sole principle of all moral laws” not only refers to in-
dependence from all material conditions; but it means will’s being law-giving of
itself as pure practical reason (KpV, AA 5:33). Here and in several other passages
Kant constitutes almost an equation or at least a circularity between the notions
of practical reason, moral law, autonomy and freedom in the positive sense (see
also GMS, AA 4:450). All human agents, being rational and free, possess this ca-
pacity. The categorical imperative is just the formulation of this law, as the pure
form of the will in which no contingencies are involved. We can provide justifi-
cation for basic principles of justice and duties of virtue by the categorical im-
perative: first with the procedural reasoning of contradiction in conception
and then contradiction in willing tests. Therefore Kant justifies moral objectivism
with reference to practical resourcefulness of reason itself and establishes
human autonomy as an inalienable capacity. This primitive base does not de-
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mand any reference to values or teleology. Moreover, the value-laden baggage of
Kantian morality does not seem to fit into this plain picture, therefore notions
such as human dignity, holiness of the moral law or considering moral demands
as if they are divine commands seem unnecessary. Even though Kant often uses
such vocabulary, he does not provide their objective validity. These further as-
pects of a moral view of the world gain the status of a peculiar kind of subjective
certainty. That subjectivity is not simply a psychological consolation nor a pro-
jection of human needs. Reflective judgment makes the backbone of such sub-
jective commitments about which the agent has a universally communicable
voice.
As is well-known, the notion of hope is the central element in Kant’s philos-
ophy of religion. He introduces hope in relation to the highest good. The highest
good has two distinct components with totally distinct laws. Kant claims that
only a supreme author who is omniscient, all-good and wise can make a teleo-
logical unity possible between laws of nature and morals. Consequently, the
highest good can be hoped for only through the idea of the Divinity. In that
sense according to Kant, morality becomes fully rational in religion. Kant argues
that the highest good has an objective validity, as it arises from reason as a need.
Nevertheless, the idea of God, the rational belief in God can be subjectively nec-
essary but objectively permissible. Even though Kant is unable to provide a
sound construction of the postulate of God in the second Critique and in that
context fails to argue why God is required for the rational completeness of mor-
ality (KpV, AA 5:124), he introduces the indispensable notion of “voluntary, ra-
tional faith/belief as a subjective necessity” to philosophical theology (KrV ,
A 813–30/B 841–57; KpV, AA 5:9, 57, 125, 143; MS, AA 6:439, 443, 487). In addi-
tion, Kant’s aesthetic judgment exposes an alternative and this-worldly or imma-
nent hope. That hope is dependent on one’s considering autonomy as a godlike
paradigm that the divine will stand as an exemplar for the moral agent to align
her willing with.
In our aesthetic experiences we have a disinterested pleasure just through a
representation of a beautiful object.Without a direct interest, without the actual
existence, holding or making use of an object, we can and do enjoy its beauty
(KU, AA 5:206). This disinterested pleasure we have through the experience of
the beautiful provides an analogy for the moral contentment that is a result of
obeying the moral law for its own sake. I contend that this contentment should
make a crucial aspect of any interpretation of “the highest good” as Kant asserts
“a joyous heart” to be a sign of genuineness of virtuous disposition (RGV,
AA 6:23). The moral contentment, or what Wicks describes as participation in di-
vine pleasure, introduces a peculiar state of the soul. This blessedness or com-
plete satisfaction, which is not a sensory feeling as Kant repeatedly states, builds
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a bridge upon the “incalculable gulf” (KU, AA 5:176) between our feelings and
rational determinations. The aesthetic ideal of human beauty, the teleological
conception of nature as a purposive whole are sensible images of morality. As
Guyer puts it, they allow us to project that the absolutely formal and inert
moral command can have an approximate representation in nature, in the sen-
sible world, in the form of the beautiful and the sublime (Guyer, 1990; Chignell,
2010, 198–208). In this regard, aesthetic experiences provide a peculiar and in-
direct kind of rational and affective completeness for morality. That singular, im-
manent and unmediated experience involves in itself a universal communicabil-
ity. That first person conviction in judging the beautiful and the sublime, about
which Kant asserts that we can and should demand others to agree, provides a
strong base about who we are, where we are and what we are capable of achiev-
ing and enjoying. As long as one is attentive, one is capable of having such mo-
ments in which one’s overall experience of oneself, others and all there is are
harmoniously integrated. Both in the experience of the beautiful and the sub-
lime; we are informed about ourselves, not simply about the object of our expe-
rience (KU, AA 5:218, 229, 251). This relational and momentary nature of aesthetic
experience enables a ground to construct a teleologically united moral view of
the world which is not deductive, yet communicable. Along these lines, Kant en-
dorses a contentedness, and even cheerfulness (MS, AA 6:485) for the agent who
obeys the duty for duty’s sake, and hints at a robust singular moral experience by
the extension in his vocabulary, occasionally mentioning notions that are not in-
volved in the core principles of his moral theory (e.g. moral law becoming the
strongest incentive for the heart: GMS, AA 4:411; KpV, AA 5:153).
In Kant’s moral theology, God is initially the supreme moral agent for us
whose will is the moral law itself. What we are capable of accessing is our
share of the divine in us; i.e. the capacity to will godlike. In this regard the
moral law is holy (KpV, AA 5:32), and the moral human agent has incommensu-
rable dignity by her capacity towards holiness. Accordingly, Kant states that to
be virtuous (a robust actualization of autonomy) is literally to resemble a
Deity (KpV, AA 5:82), yet we can never achieve this. This idea of holiness in us
and autonomy as dignity provide a perspective in which we are not beings
only shaped by the needs and demands of the sensible world but are members
of an order of all things with a telos (KpV, AA 5:87). In her efforts to harmonize
herself with this order through the guidance of the moral law, the moral agent’s
freedom resembles beatitude, which is the contentment of a supreme being free
of inclinations (KpV, AA 5:119). The conjunction of teleology and deontology be-
comes possible when the divinity is considered as the one supreme lawgiver
(GMS, AA 4:439). Only through this teleological perspective can the moral
agent consider herself to harmonize or align her limited willing with an absolute
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and perfect counterpart (KpV, AA 5:130). In this picture, divine will becomes a
paradigm, a perfect model for autonomy. Only through this perspective does
the moral will become an intrinsic element of ontology. That is, once moral vo-
lition is considered also as an instantiation of a telos it substantially impresses
the agent’s moral experience.
Depicting a broad understanding of autonomy from a capacity to a para-
digm, it is legitimate to apply varying degrees of justification and types of judg-
ing in different domains which need not end up with worries such as a deflation
with respect to postulates of practical reason (Redding, 2012, 6–7). This is be-
cause, first of all according to Kant, humility and fallibilism are inherent proper-
ties of human judging. Secondly, judging itself is the core of Kant’s philosophy.
Correspondingly, judging is the actual moment of spontaneity where we both
witness and construct ourselves. In particular, reflexive judgment, in which we
also judge about ourselves along with our overall experience, does not simply
regulate our knowledge claims but provides an untouchable freedom for each
to judge her own existence. Then one’s pondering about her existence could bet-
ter be considered as a self-fulfilling prophecy rather than an inert projection of
reason to the cosmos.
It is in this regard I consider autonomy initially as a natural and justifiable
human capacity, but also as the divine in us, i.e. the ground of human dignity
which is not objectively demonstrable. It is significant not to ignore Kant’s re-
peated awe and wonder about how pure reason is practical of itself, how the
will determines itself immediately and how the law can be an incentive on the
heart. Standing by Kant’s redline (avoiding dogmatism of rational metaphysics,
foundationalism), I emphasize the spontaneity of reason, i.e. our judgmental ca-
pacity which makes the conjunction point for reason, will, freedom, agency, self,
character and finally one’s worldview to converge. In that moment of spontane-
ity one is able to consider the moral law also as a divine command or as the dig-
nity of humanity, whereas all are bound with it even without this aspiration. Ac-
cordingly, this spontaneity constructs not only one’s understanding of the scope
of human agency but shapes one’s treating of oneself, others and the cosmos.
Though this is at best a hermeneutical approach, it is no less real for the
agent compared with any metaphysical theory or dogma.
In this paper, I argue for a latitude in interpreting autonomy. This latitude
starts from the irreducible and inalienable rational capacity to be moral, towards
the idea of autonomy as paradigm. The initial conception does not demand any
reference to values or teleology.We can provide justification of basic moral prin-
ciples of justice and duties of virtue via applying to the categorical imperative.
That provides us a cosmopolitan and non-relativist initial ground for moral theo-
ry. Nevertheless, I argue that those objectively valid first principles do not suffice
1584 Seniye Tilev
to embrace the overall moral experience. Beyond this, autonomy is an organic
experience of real moral agents,which means an ongoing, non-static, irreducible
and inexplicable judgmental process about one’s actualization of oneself. This
latitude provides the paradigm of a divine will for autonomy which invites teleo-
logical and value-laden baggage into moral experience.
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